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12 Muslim Voices in the Blogosphere
Mosaics of Local–Global Discourses
Merlyna Lim
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the effect of 
globalization on Islam has not only become a hot topic, but also more of a 
reality. Other world events following that day, such as the United States’ war 
on terror and the Israel–Hezbollah confl ict have awakened a consciousness 
among Muslims all over the world to unite and stand up for themselves. 
The concept of Ummah—a universal community of those who profess the 
Islamic faith, a community that transcends race, ethnicity, nationality, and 
class—has become more important in the minds of many Muslims.1
The proliferation of new information and communication technologies, 
such as satellite television and the Internet, is also promoting a greater 
Ummah consciousness, a heightened sense of belonging to a global com-
munity of believers. Global networks can potentially become vehicles that 
transform local concerns into global causes and vice versa. The recent devel-
opment of Internet applications, such as blogs and other social exchange 
and networking software, has enabled more people to engage in global 
conversations. Blogs, in particular, can potentially be a venue for global 
dialogue and the formation of a global community.
Through a comparative study of the Indonesian and Iranian blogo-
spheres, this chapter shows that these platforms and the messages they 
promote do not, however, result in a single global metanarrative2 or the 
advocacy for a single course of action. The local contextualization of glob-
ally circulating discourses results in a diverse mosaic of interpretations, 
positions, and identifi cations of sources of discontent.
From this perspective, blogging and the blogosphere can be seen as 
being self-organized into nodes, networks, and streams that, while they 
overlap, cannot readily be molded into a hegemonic voice or viewpoint. 
The importance of this fi nding to the study of new media, particularly the 
blogosphere, is that while certain moments, such as the Jyllands-Posten 
Muhammad cartoons controversy,3 are volatile and spread throughout 
the globe through electronic information technologies, they can neither 
be said to embolden resistance uniformly everywhere nor be imagined as 
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fostering a “contest of civilizations.” Yet, the technologies of the Inter-
net and the advent of the blogosphere offer a decisively innovative set of 
interconnected pathways toward a public sphere that reaches far below 
and rises high above the territorial level of the nation-state. In this sense, 
it creates key conditions for civil society and allows collective voices to 
move from the local to the global and back again, no matter how dispa-
rate these voices might be.
Before moving to look in detail at the cases of the Iranian and Indone-
sian blogospheres, the following section will provide some background on 
how blogging emerged as one of most popular social activities currently 
undertaken in cyberspace, and how blogging and politics have become 
increasingly interrelated.
BLOGGING AND POLITICS
Wikipedia defi nes a weblog (usually shortened to blog) as “a web-based 
publication consisting primarily of periodic articles (normally in reverse 
chronological order).”4 Blogs allow for the instant, chronological, and fre-
quently updated communication of information, such as personal thoughts, 
news, and events. Blogs not only create an online journal that remains 
archived online, they are also indexed and searchable by search engines. 
With millions now online, blogs offer a new way for communicating and 
discovering social metadata and provide advantages over other web-based 
information sites, such as conventional websites, e-mails, forums, and 
mailing lists.
In the domain of politics, the rise of blogging has provoked discourse 
on incommodious issues. However, until early 2004, blogs were not yet 
perceived as playing any signifi cant political role. Compared to other play-
ers in domestic politics and mainstream or mass media, bloggers and their 
blogs did not appear to be either powerful or visible, as underscored by 
statistics showing that even the most popular blogs received only a tiny pro-
portion of the web traffi c that the major media outlets attracted. The 2003 
Pew Internet Survey reported that only 4 percent of Americans reported 
going to blogs for information and opinions.5 With this in mind, the New 
York Times quipped, “Never have so many people written so much to be 
read by so few.”6
But that perception changed with the rapid and progressive deployment 
of the Internet during the 2004 United States Presidential campaign. Even 
with only 9 percent of Internet users reporting that they frequently or some-
times read political blogs during the election campaign, blogs started to be 
seen as of potential signifi cance to politics. Several candidates and political 
parties set up blogs during the campaign. Among the more notable was 
Howard Dean’s Blog for America, which was exemplary in showing how 
a blog could be used for building social networks of political support. By 
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September 2003, Dean’s campaign had raised $7.4 million via the Internet, 
out of a total of $14.8 million, with a remarkably modest average donation 
of under $100.
Dean’s blogging phenomenon and a rapid rise in the popularity and pro-
liferation of blogs marked 2004 as an important year in the history of the 
blogosphere. By the end of that year, the term blog had been chosen as the 
top word of 2004 by Merriam-Webster, a US dictionary publisher.7 And 
in subsequent years, blogging has become much more popular. The 2006 
Pew Internet survey8 reports that 8 percent of Internet users, or about 12 
million American adults, keep a blog, while 39 percent of Internet users, or 
about 57 million American adults, read blogs, and the numbers have shown 
a signifi cant increase since the fall of 2005. The popularity of blogging is 
also increasing in other countries, including Iran and Indonesia.
While the biggest portion of the blogosphere is devoted to personal stories/
journals, political blogs do exist and some of them are among the most popu-
lar. Dubbed a catalyst for change and the people’s media, some argue that 
blogs could be an empowering tool for society, especially in countries where 
strict media censorship and surveillance is conducted. Dan Gillmor, a veteran 
journalist, hails the rise of blogs as the beginning of a citizen journalism era, 
where the marginalized can at last play a greater role in making rather than 
merely consuming news.9 Some observers strongly believe that if politicians 
would all start blogging, public debate would be dramatically revitalized.
However, as previously hinted, even in the United States, the blogo-
sphere suffers from the unequal distribution of readers across an array of 
blogs. While there are over one million bloggers in the United States post-
ing approximately 275,000 new items daily, the average blogger has almost 
no political infl uence, as measured by traffi c or hyperlinks. The distribu-
tion of links and traffi c is heavily skewed, with only a handful bloggers get-
ting most readers.10 Presumably, the blogospheres in other countries would 
be found to suffer even more from the same problem. If the blogosphere is 
to be seen as an exemplary public sphere where everybody’s voice can be 
heard, then this tendency shows that not to be the case. Yet, this could also 
be seen as a selection process weeding out the “bad” from the “desirable,” 
although a limited observation shows that the top bloggers are not neces-
sarily better than the rest.
Another constraint is that most blogs are not maintained professionally. 
Most bloggers are part-time, and blogging is almost exclusively a volun-
tarily venture. This means that, unlike professional journalists, bloggers 
mostly do not have the capacity to do any research or investigation prior to 
publishing their opinions. The credibility of blog entries, in this regard, is 
lower than articles in mainstream media. This does not mean that postings 
in the blogosphere are not as critical as those in the mainstream media, 
if not more so. Being a voluntary activity, blogging also can be seen as a 
positive force for regular people to voice their opinions without having 
to go through the exhaustive fi ltering of traditional journalism that often 
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excludes some critical, unconventional, or controversial voices from the 
professional media sphere.
Also, there is no central organization to the blogosphere. No consensus 
exists among the bloggers/readers with regard to many key issues. This 
contributes to the pessimistic view that the blogosphere strengthens the 
Tower of Babel tendency11 in cyberspace, where voices tend to be so idio-
syncratic as to be meaningless to casual readers. Through a more positive 
lens, however, this could also mean that the blogosphere can potentially 
encourage more genuine individual voices to emerge and real dialogues to 
be created.
With these dynamics of the blogosphere in mind, this chapter investi-
gates the cases of Indonesian and Iranian bloggers in relation to selected 
global political issues related to Islam in an effort to show how the general 
features of the blogosphere do not always have the same outcomes, even in 
societies with similar religious orientations. Instead, the convivial12 nature 
of the Internet that is unreservedly amplifi ed in the blogosphere, and the 
local contextualization of information, knowledge, and ideas, together resist 
the emergence of a single storyline put forth by any single powerful player. 
However, in this milieu of free-fl owing ideas, at any one moment, a limited 
number of popular or preferred storylines is likely to appear, as manifested 
by increased numbers of hits or visits to certain blogs. Yet these, too, vary 
from setting to setting, as the Indonesian and Iranian cases reveal.
The cases of Indonesia and Iran were chosen not merely because both 
societies are predominantly Muslim and both offer rich examples and illus-
trate how Muslim society and Internet technology are mutually interact-
ing. Both are examples of different political systems, Indonesia being the 
world’s most populous Muslim country, but with a secular democratic gov-
ernment, and Iran being an undemocratic Islamic state. The cases also offer 
formidable challenges to some variants of Western modernization theory—
the assumption of a declining role for religion—by showcasing how reli-
gion can couple with technology to force society to move in the direction 
of modernization. In both countries, religious sentiment and leadership, 
and not the secular intelligentsia, have lent coherence and force to the mod-
ernization and development project, particularly through information and 
communication technology.
THE INTERNET AND BLOGOSPHERES 
IN INDONESIA AND IRAN
To fully understand the dynamics of the Muslim blogospheres in Iran and 
Indonesia, one has to understand the sociopolitical histories of Internet 
development in both countries. This section will narrate the brief histories 
of the Iranian and Indonesian Internets to provide a backdrop to under-
standing the development, uses, and impacts of blogs in both countries.
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INDONESIA
Although the Internet arrived in Indonesia in the early 1980s, when the fi rst 
connection from the University of Indonesia was made to the service pro-
vider UUNet, because of a lack of basic infrastructure, no permanent Inter-
net link was established until 1994. With the arrival of private commercial 
Internet service providers (ISPs), the Internet attained a public presence by 
1995, followed by a boom in ISPs at the end of 1997. The mushrooming of 
ISPs, however, did not lead to the Internet being widely used, since most 
Indonesians could not afford to pay the subscription fees in combination 
with the telephone-line rental necessary to connect.
It was not household connections but warnet, or Internet cafés, a grass-
roots form of commercial Internet connection that developed without 
government intervention, which played a signifi cant role in popularizing 
Internet use among society at large. From 1996 onward, warnet became 
the main access points for more than 50 percent of Indonesian Internet 
users. For most users, the warnet facilitate not only online social relation-
ships, but also function as places for extending online relationships into 
offl ine settings. With the expansion of warnet, telecenters, and campus/
school-based access points, Indonesia has experienced a dramatic growth 
in Internet usage, from only 20,000 users in 1995 to 16 million users in 
2005. Yet, more than a decade since the Internet fi rst entered the nation, it 
is still only available to less than 1 percent of the total population. It is the 
price of Internet access, in addition to a lack of basic infrastructure, rather 
than political concerns, that are the primary barriers to the widespread 
usage of fast Internet connections.
Historically, the Internet in Indonesia has always been entangled with poli-
tics, and its development has very much run in tandem with discourses of 
democratization. During the Suharto era, Internet development in Indone-
sia provided a much more democratic media environment when compared to 
other media spheres, such as television, radio, and print. In addition, political 
experiences of the 1990s show how the substantially unregulated Internet 
contributed to the political reforms that led to the downfall of Order Baru.13
The Indonesian Internet operates in a reasonably free sociopoliti-
cal environment, under a relatively new government that is still trying to 
recover from the sociopolitical damage resulting from a long period under 
an undemocratic and authoritarian system. No censorship, surveillance, or 
control over self-expression either on- or offl ine have been formally applied 
in Indonesia since the overthrow of Suharto’s New Order government, 
which lasted from 1965 to 1998. The people of Indonesia can now freely 
access all forms of media, and media are also free from outright censorship 
by the government. The blogosphere thus emerged in an unregulated Inter-
net environment in Indonesia.
While some Indonesian bloggers started their fi rst blogs as early as 
2001, blogging only became popular in 2004, mostly due to the progressive 
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campaigns of some early bloggers, such as Enda Nasution,14 known as the 
father of Indonesian blogging, Priyadi,15 and A. Fatih Syuhud,16 as well as 
the availability of (currently) free blogging platforms, such as blogger, live-
journal, blogdrive, wordpress, multiply, and Friendster’s blog. The num-
ber of Indonesian bloggers is not well documented, as shown by estimates 
ranging from 100,000 to 1,000,000. While the list of the top 100 Indone-
sian bloggers is dominated by male Internet users, a signifi cant percentage 
of female bloggers can also be observed in the Indonesian blogosphere. 
Most female bloggers are not into blogs dedicated specifi cally to politics, 
but they do intersperse politics into their stories and conversations about 
everyday life experience.
Based on my observations, Indonesian bloggers seem to need to be net-
worked in communities. Big clusters of networked blogs are commonly 
found in the Indonesian blogosphere. Among the biggest blogging commu-
nities is that of Muslim bloggers,17 where the community leaders (modera-
tors) actively endorse some community (Islamic) values and encourage the 
members to address issues related to Islam and the Muslim world.
Iran
The origins of the Iranian Internet date back to 1987, with the establish-
ment of the fi rst dial-up connection from the Institute for Studies in Theo-
retical Physics and Mathematics through the co-operative U.S. university 
network BITNET network and Iran’s membership in the European Aca-
demic Research Network. The link later developed into a national network 
with fi ve hundred assigned Internet Protocol addresses. The fi rst primary 
users of the connection were academics and research institutions.
The internal data network, though, was only established in 1993 by 
the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI), which planned to build 
a nationwide packet-switched network based on the X.25 protocol, Iran-
Pac. In 1995, however, the government took over IranPac, clamped down 
on private information services, and advanced the development of its own 
data communication network. Over subsequent years, Iran witnessed a 
very rapid growth in its Internet network, as the Internet quickly became 
embedded in the sociopolitics of Iranian society. In the May 1997 elections, 
two leading presidential candidates, President Khatami18 and the conserva-
tive candidate, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri,19 both used websites to get their 
message across, and the election results were announced online on the Ira-
nian government’s website.20 The Iranian Internet continued to experience 
a remarkable growth, increasing from about one million users in 2001 to 
approximately fi ve million users in 2005. With more than 1,500 cybercafés 
(in Tehran alone), around 5,000 Internet hosts (in 2003), and 650 ISPs, the 
number is expected to reach 25 million in 2009.21
Unlike other media, which are subject to harsh Iranian government cen-
sorship, initially the Internet was relatively free. This resulted in the Internet 
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becoming one of the most important information resources in Iran. Polls 
show that people rely more on the Internet than any other media as a source 
of information, and beginning in 2000, more Iranians began to use the tech-
nology to circumvent the state’s control over conventional media sources; 
this was marked by a burst of growth in online content in the Farsi and 
English languages. The state responded by applying a sophisticated state-
mandated fi ltering system. The OpenNet Initiative’s testing shows that more 
than 30 percent of websites are blocked by this fi lter. The Iranian govern-
ment has effectively blocked access to:
pornographic online sites, most anonymizer tools (which allow users 
to surf the Internet without detection), a large number of sites with 
gay and lesbian content, some politically sensitive sites, women’s rights 
sites, and certain targeted blogs, among other types of sites.22
While there is no specifi c regulation regarding Internet content, the govern-
ment does enforce strict controls on Internet materials under the country’s 
Press Law.23 For example, individuals who subscribe to ISPs must promise, 
in writing, not to access “non-Islamic” sites. However, the state apparently 
does not monitor the content of pages that users access. Yet, in some cities, 
judges have announced that they do intend to monitor usage in cybercafés 
while on the lookout for prohibited activities, which includes viewing non-
Islamic material. Even in the face of such threats, Iranians still perceive the 
Internet as a relatively freer sphere for expressing opinions in comparison 
with other media spheres.
Thus, unlike the case in Indonesia, blogging in Iran operates under par-
ticular circumstances, as the Iranian government tends to discourage self-
expression. A heavily censored, state-controlled mainstream media have 
created an environment for the Iranian blog to be potentially more impor-
tant than blogs in the United States, Western Europe, and other more demo-
cratic countries, such as Indonesia, since blogs in general tend to be relatively 
unregulated compared to other forms of expression in Iranian society.
In April 2005, the BBC reported that Massih Ali-Nejad, an Iranian 
investigative journalist, had been barred by the conservative-controlled 
parliament of Iran after she exposed parliament members’ huge pay and 
bonuses.24 Ali-Nejad turned to blogging and continues to write about Ira-
nian Members of Parliament in her blog. Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a former 
chief of staff of President Khatami, a vice president of legal and parliamen-
tary affairs, and one of Khatami’s advisors, also turned to blogging to voice 
his political opinions and views. He said that blogs “let me be myself . . . 
regardless of my offi cial and governmental status.” These two very differ-
ent examples represent but a fraction of the Iranian blogosphere, which is 
perhaps among the most exciting in any language or cultural context.
In a country that has a population of about seventy million, almost three-
quarters of which are under the age of thirty, apart from journalists like 
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Ali-Nejad and politicians like Ali Abtahi, many students have also turned to 
blogging. Among the most prominent student bloggers is a Toronto-based 
Iranian, Hossein Derakhshan, aka, Hoder. He has actively promoted blog-
ging in Iran by explaining the steps necessary to start a blog and encourag-
ing Iranians to use the available platforms to create their own blogs.25
As of October 2005, there were estimated to be about 700,000 Iranian 
blogs out of an estimated total of 100 million worldwide, of which about 
40,000–110,000 are active and mostly written in the Persian language, the 
offi cial language of Iran. Among the active blogs, many are available in both 
Persian and English versions. Through their bilingual blogs, users share their 
lives and perceptions with the world. Hossein Derakhshan argues that the Ira-
nian blogosphere is a window to look into another culture, a café where Ira-
nians can meet to discuss matters in ways not possible in the offl ine world due 
to geography, politics, or language, and thus blogs form a bridge for people or 
groups from different communities to interact and communicate.
In July 2006, Iran’s President Ahmadinejad launched his own blog.26 
Well-designed and written in four languages, the blog attracts many visi-
tors, not only from Iran, but also from other places in the world. The Pres-
ident’s decision to start a blog lends offi cial sanction to the importance of 
the blogosphere in Iran’s political realm.
GLOBAL ISSUES IN THE INDONESIAN AND 
IRANIAN BLOGOSPHERES: NARRATIVES 
OF CONSPIRACY/VICTIMIZATION
As countries whose populations are predominantly Muslim, both Indo-
nesia and Iran share some similar political narratives, yet with different 
iterations. One of the grandest narratives shared is related to Jewish con-
spiracies and the existence of Israel as a nation-state, which is closely con-
nected to the narrative of a global Western–Israel (or Zionists–Crusaders, 
US–Israel, or Christians–Jews) conspiracy against Islam that is more wide-
spread around the globe.
Historically, this narrative has been associated with two important lines 
of reasoning. First, radical fundamentalists in both Indonesia and Iran 
believe that none of the many aspects of modernization, including secular-
ization and rationalization, the shift from traditional values to more liberal 
ones, and the global economy and its culture of individualism and hedo-
nism, can be seen as independent processes, but rather should be viewed 
as interlocking aspects of a plot against Islam. This behind-the-scenes con-
spiracy with the purpose of destroying Islam is identifi ed with Jews and 
Zionism, and anybody who is considered to be “helping” this conspiracy—
no matter from what religion or background—can be called a Zionist.27
Second, the conspiracy theories and the tendency to scapegoat Jews orig-
inally came from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
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Egypt,28 whose hatred of Israel is directly related to the Palestine case. In 
addition, the belief in a Jewish conspiracy to destroy Islam and to dictate 
to the whole world is not only a reaction to Israel’s existence, but is also 
exacerbated by the dissemination of anti-Semitism from the West, includ-
ing Russia, to Arabic countries. The source that is frequently referred to is 
Al-Maka id Al-Yahudiyah, or The Protocol of the Elders of Zion,29 which 
is seen as proof of this conspiracy. In the 1950s, an Arabic version was pub-
lished. This piece of writing was translated and adapted into Indonesian in 
the 1980s.30
For today’s Muslim world, though, these past stories do not matter that 
much. More contemporary events, such as the lengthy Israeli–Palestin-
ian confl ict (which is perceived as a religious war rather than a territorial 
one), the “victimization” of Muslims all over the world (Bosnia, Kashmir, 
Chechnya, and Iraq are prominent cases), and moreover, the aggressive 
“War on Terrorism” by the United States and other governments, now have 
more signifi cant meaning. They are seen as underlying the global narrative 
of conspiracy against Islam.
Previous studies on cyberradical fundamentalism in Indonesia show that 
many Muslims have become sensitized to issues affecting Muslims world-
wide via the Internet and have developed a collective sense of identity and 
resistance through it. Yet, there is no evidence that any of these users have 
gone straight to a Palestinian or Iraqi training camp from an Internet café.31 
Jihad, in the form of physical war, is neither simply a blind and bloody-
minded scrabble for temporal power nor solely a door through which to 
pass into the hereafter. Rather, it is a form of political action in which the 
pursuit of immortality is inextricably linked to a profoundly this-worldly 
endeavor—the founding or recreation of a just community on earth.32
Other studies confi rm that the majority of Muslims are moderate and 
are not prone to joining radical jihadi groups.33 Most Muslims cannot be 
categorized as being capable of “killing for politics or religion.” Yet, similar 
studies have found that the belief that the West and Israel (Zionists–Cru-
saders or Jews–Christians) are conspiring against Islam is prevalent even 
among moderate Muslims worldwide, including those in Indonesia and 
Iran. In the last fi ve years, after the September 11th attacks and the launch 
of George W. Bush’s War on Terrorism, the “Zionist–Crusader/Jewish–
Christian/Israel–US conspiracy against Islam” has become an extremely 
popular topic, and narratives on this theme fl y around the blogospheres, 
and elsewhere in cyberspace, print media, and daily conversations in Indo-
nesia and Iran.
At the same time, from within the body of Islam itself, much effort has 
been devoted by reformist believers to a struggle against the growth of 
radical fundamentalism and anti-Americanism in the post-September 11th 
context. Reformists, too, use the media, including the Internet, to spread 
their message of tolerance and peace, as Islam does profess itself as a reli-
gion of peace. The voices of these moderate and tolerant Muslims, however, 
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are subdued by the fact that US foreign policy is lacking in sensitivity and 
nuance to its effects on the ground in the Muslim world. For example, in 
Indonesia and Iran, just like in any other part of the Muslim world, US 
policies toward Palestine and Israel are not seen as mutually supportive. 
The policy of the United States toward Israel is interpreted essentially as an 
anti-Muslim policy. In this manner, the discontent that US policies create 
in a place like Jerusalem, and places like the West Bank and Gaza, becomes 
indistinguishable from the policies of Israel. The Afghanistan invasion, and 
especially the Iraq invasion, has only strengthened this perception. The per-
sistence of this conspiracy theory in today’s deeply polarized world of poli-
tics has created a situation where Muslims who access global information 
through selected sites cannot help but frame world events—especially those 
related to Islam/Muslims—within this framework of conspiracy, which has 
now become a metanarrative underlying many Muslim believers’ interpreta-
tions, perceptions, and analyses of current events.
Focusing on two recent issues related to the Muslim world, the following 
discussion provides some snapshots of how two blogospheres, in two dif-
ferent Muslim countries, on different continents, and with different politi-
cal systems, but that do share some similar concerns have responded. The 
cases under investigation are the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons 
controversy and the letter sent by President Ahmadinejad of the Iranian 
Republic to President Bush of the United States.
THE JYLLANDS-POSTEN MUHAMMAD 
CARTOONS CONTROVERSY
The Muhammad cartoons controversy began after the Danish newspa-
per. Jylllands-Posten, published twelve editorial cartoons, most of which 
depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad, on September 30, 2005.34 The 
controversy spilled out onto the blogosphere on February 8, 2006, when 
the “Freedom for Egyptians” blog35 published scans reportedly showing 
six of the cartoons, including the “turban bomb” image that had been 
reprinted in the October 17, 2005 issue of El Faqr, an Egyptian newspaper. 
On the same day, the “Egyptian Sandmonkey” blog36 followed this by pub-
lishing a different version of the scanned pages from El Faqr.
Following these Egyptian bloggers, Muslim bloggers all over the world 
reacted to the controversy by posting various entries. On this issue, the Ira-
nian blogosphere displayed both more polarized, as well as more nuanced 
opinions, when compared with the Indonesian reaction. In the Indonesian 
blogosphere, a large number of bloggers accused Jyllands-Posten of blas-
phemy and an abuse of freedom of expression. Among this group, some 
condemning Jyllands-Posten believed this blasphemous act to be proof of 
the hatred of the West for Islam and linked it to the global conspiracy meta-
narrative. They suggested that Muslims in Indonesia and all over the world 
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should boycott Danish products. From February 2006 onward, banners 
proclaiming “Boycott Danish products” were pervasive in the Indonesian 
blogosphere.
In the Iranian blogosphere, however, such sentiments were not so pervasive. 
Although Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, ordered a ban on Danish prod-
ucts (the Indonesian president did not do the same), Iranian bloggers were not 
keen on boycotting Danish products and did not think that such action was 
necessary. Regarding this issue, an Iranian commented in his blog:
So much about these Danish cartoons these days that fi nally got here 
in Iran. Members of the government oriented Malissia groups together 
with some hard-line clerics attacked the Danish embassy. Ahmadinejad 
ordered the ban of Danish goods although I have not seen a signifi cant 
reaction from the body of people. The fact that Iran did all these after 
most of the other Muslim countries is kind of odd! Seems that Iran sud-
denly woke up and sensed a competition from others around the world 
and feared that Iran might have called not Muslim [sic] enough by oth-
ers! But I am sure Danish pastry that is very popular in every and each 
pastry shop in Tehran, will be there although some stupids suggested 
it’s [sic] name to be changed!37
There was a small group of Indonesian bloggers who tried to be more criti-
cal about this issue. While they also thought that the Danish cartoons were 
proof of the abuse of freedom of expression, they did not necessarily link 
this to any conspiracy. They also deemed that the extreme actions taken by 
some Muslims, who turned to protest and violent acts, were not rightful 
and went against the core of Islamic teaching. Some Iranians shared similar 
opinions with this Indonesian group.
Unsurprisingly, there was no known Indonesian blogger who defended the 
Jyllands-Posten nor had the courage to display the cartoons. According to the 
discussion carried on via the comment boxes of some blogs, many of those 
who condemned the Danish cartoonists never actually saw the cartoons.
Two Indonesian bloggers who declared themselves to be moderate–lib-
eral Muslims articulated that they did not publish the cartoons in their 
blogs based on the belief that it is forbidden to depict Muhammad in the 
form of cartoons. Their hesitance was more rooted in the feeling that they 
would have been threatened had they done so. One blogger commented:
There are preman berjubah,38 moral police, everywhere, including in 
cyberspace. I do not want to jeopardize myself just by voicing my opin-
ion about this cartoon or about anything related to Islam generally in 
my blog. Not worth it.
One thing that was not paralleled in the Indonesian blogosphere is that, in 
the Iranian blogosphere, there were some bloggers who fully supported the 
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Danish cartoonists. As Muslims (and Iranians), they stood fi rm in defend-
ing the freedom of expression. This does not mean that there were no Indo-
nesian bloggers who shared similar opinions with these Iranian “freedom 
of expression” defenders. There might have been some, but they did not 
support this position in their blogs. As hinted at in the comment of the 
moderate Muslim cited above, self-censorship could have been among the 
reasons for their silence. Meanwhile, something cultural lies behind “not 
saying anything” in the Indonesian context.39 The absence of a reaction can 
actually be interpreted as a sign of disagreement. Thus, in this context, the 
fact that there were many Indonesian bloggers who did not say anything 
about the issue does not automatically exclude them from the discourse. 
Many of them might have actually been expressing their disagreement with 
the majority opinion through expressing no reaction.
One important aspect that should be brought into consideration is the 
fact that most Indonesian Muslims belong to the Sunni tradition, while Ira-
nians are mostly Shia/Shiite. The Shia tradition does recognize the graphi-
cal representation of the Prophet Muhammad—something not recognized 
in the Sunni tradition. Thus, it might have been easier for the Iranian Shi-
ites to tolerate the cartoons when compared to the Indonesian Sunnis.
AHMADINEJAD: A HERO OR A FAILURE?
In May 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent President 
George Bush an eighteen-page letter discussing religious values, history, 
and international relations.40 In it, Ahmadinejad criticized the US invasion 
of Iraq and urged Bush to return to religious principles. This long, well-
written letter was quickly circulated in the blogosphere and translated into 
English, as well as various other languages, including Indonesian.
Indonesian Muslim bloggers cheerfully welcomed this letter as a gem 
that had emerged from the Islamic world. Ahmadinejad, a name that was 
formerly unknown to most Indonesians, has suddenly become an icon of 
the rise of Islam against the West. Many Indonesian bloggers now per-
ceive Ahmadinejad as an ideal president, and romanticize his being a future 
leader of the Muslim world, the global Ummah. Many Indonesians, espe-
cially female bloggers, have become emotionally attached to the speeches of 
Ahmadinejad. In their blogs, many Indonesian Muslims state that Ahma-
dinejad is speaking for them, and his speech is described as “inspiring,” 
“touching,” and “making me cry.”
When Ahmadinejad made a visit to Indonesia, he was enthusiastically 
and passionately welcomed as a new hero by Indonesians, especially young 
Muslims. His visit was covered in a large number of blogs. Glowing personal 
stories about Ahmadinejad—his choice of living a simple (poor) lifestyle, 
his piety, and his courage—were conspicuous in many of these postings. As 
refl ected in some blogs, the Indonesians’ romantic view of Ahmadinejad’s 
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leadership may be related to the frustration among Indonesian Muslims 
with multiple ongoing crises in their country. Faced with an unstable socio-
political–economic situation and many unresolved problems marking the 
transition from authoritarian to democratic governance, many Indonesians 
have turned to religion as a magic wand for transforming the country.
Ironically, the Iranians themselves mostly do not share the same opinion 
about their president. While there are some bloggers who support Ahma-
dinejad, most of the top Iranian bloggers do not think that he is a good, let 
alone ideal, president. Some perceive Ahmadinejad through his controver-
sial policies, especially those dealing with foreign affairs, as having failed 
to place Iran in a better position in the world of international politics. 
Others suggest that he would be better off using his energy and brainpower 
to fi x domestic socioeconomic problems, rather than attempting to gain 
international attention by making controversial statements.
Concerning Ahmadinejad, one Iranian blogger, who calls himself Mr. 
Behi griped:
I am going mad for everything he does [sic], from his one post blog, 
to the denial of holocaust, to his suggestion for debate with Bush, to 
his claims about being protected by hidden forces and the lies that he 
gives people about the rate of infl ation, freedom of speech and rights of 
people. He is a little ignored individual that loves to be seen no matter 
positive or negative, he does not care.41
For most of the Iranian bloggers surveyed, who know much better than Indo-
nesians how it is to live under the governance of Ahmadinejad, their president 
is little more than a failure. Iranian bloggers do recognize the growing popu-
larity of their president in the world, although they suggest that Ahmadinejad’s 
popularity is not due to his own qualities, but is more related to his enemy’s, 
US President Bush, incompetence. They also opine that Ahmadinejad tries to 
shift the attention of his own people and that of the world from his own fail-
ures by pointing out of the damage that the Bush administration has done in 
the international arena. With this in mind, one Iranian blogger states:
Imagine, without Bush Ahmadinejad would be forced to account 
for growing unemployment in Iran, for signifi cant economic decline, 
stricter social controls, greater repression for free speech and thought 
and press. In other words, if there wasn’t so much hatred for Bush and 
his own totalitarianism, there would be more pressure on Ahmadine-
jad to account for his own abuses.42
In contrast, no Indonesian blogger was observed to care about what Iranian 
bloggers themselves thought about their president. There are no known 
references made by Indonesian bloggers to any Iranian blogs concerning 
Ahmadinejad.
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The snapshots presented here show how both Indonesian and Iranian 
bloggers take up certain global issues that tap into their interests and their 
Islamic identity. However, the examples also show that there are distinct 
differences between the two. Certainly, the majority of both Indonesian 
and Iranian blogs are mostly personal. They address communal and public 
issues, including those on a global scale, but in a personal mode. Still, the 
examples display how there is more common feeling among individual opin-
ions in the Indonesian blogosphere when compared with the Iranian one. 
Indonesian bloggers seem to consider more overtly “what others think of 
him/herself” when expressing opinions. In attempts to voice personal opin-
ions, Indonesian bloggers also show a tendency to fi lter out some aspects 
that would be uncomfortable for their friends, networks, community, and 
country if spoken about. In this manner, a hidden social self-censoring of 
the blogosphere can be said to take place in Indonesia.
Iranian bloggers, on the other hand, are observed to not be so uniformly 
concerned about this kind of issue. As the blogosphere is one of few spaces 
where Iranians can freely express their personal opinions, Iranian bloggers 
take this opportunity to voice their opinions in full. Richer and more color-
ful voices thus emerge out of the Iranian blogosphere.
CONCLUSION
The cases of the Indonesian and Iranian blogospheres clearly show how 
blogs function as a means for organizing and assimilating experience, as 
well as voicing opinions. While global issues and ideas of global community, 
such as Ummah, do resonate beyond nation-states, community boundaries 
still remain. Even for those who are writing/reading in the same language 
(English), there does not appear to be any cross-cultural communication 
between Iranians and Indonesians. Yet, while there is no signifi cant dia-
logue or cross-cultural communication, contrary to polarization theory,43 
there is no example of deep polarization in either the Indonesian or Iranian 
blogospheres. What do exist are the many timbered voices not previously 
found in traditional media.
The blogosphere exists in the nexus of state–civil social relations that 
are contextualized by local histories and still affected by the power of the 
nation-state in a global era. Thus, although practice might still depart from 
the ideal, in the case of Indonesia, a secular, democratic form of gover-
nance has been wrested from an authoritarian regime. In this context, the 
discourse on Islam in the world does not present itself as a contest between 
civil society and the state. As such, it might seem to be less diverse because 
it tends to cater more to social than political pressures concerning what can 
and cannot be said in the blogosphere.
In contrast, Iranians live under a conservative religious government that 
is itself entangled in global Islam and, at the same time, engaged in a contest 
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with many elements of civil society over basic rights of voice and expression 
in the public sphere. The fact that the Iranian blogosphere mixes critiques 
of the world at large with the government there is thus not surprising.
These observations return the discussion to the main theme of this 
chapter: the very technology of the Internet, which defi es central manage-
ment and control, and also defi es global metanarratives. To be sure, such 
metanarratives do emerge and do have their moments of currency, but as 
this discussion has shown, the mix of the distant global and the intimately 
lived local in the context of the Internet-based blogosphere soon allows 
for nuances, differences, and even counterhegemonic voices. Whether this 
should be celebrated or not is yet another matter about which many voices 
can speak.
The cases discussed here also show that while cyberspace can promote 
a greater Ummah consciousness, it does not remove its users from their 
localities. The territorial-based localities retain their relevance. The cases 
presented also show that Islam is not monolithic. Just as it is uniquely and 
culturally practiced in Indonesia, Iran, and other places, Islam is personal-
ized, contextualized, and territorialized in the blogosphere, too.
The blogosphere is indeed one of those spheres where global or postna-
tional identity, such as Islamic identity, and ideas of community, such as 
a global electronic Ummah, can be molded and formed. However, post-
national identity is not a matter of disavowing national difference, but 
rather of “constituting a discursive device which represent difference as . . 
. identity.”44 In the case of religious identity, identity can also recognize the 
national nature of communities while, at the same time, projecting them 
beyond the nation. In this regard, the common generalization about reli-
gious identity being in opposition to the nation state is misleading. Rather, 
in a network society, postnational types of identity are fl uid and can take 
different forms according to social–political–historical contexts, moving 
from being nationalist, to challenging nationalism, or to a mixture of both. 
More specifi cally, at the current juncture in history when the nation-state is 
still a basic unit of territorial power and popular identity, seizing the nation-
state and placing it under the aegis of postnational identity can be viewed as 
a practical approach toward ideologically, as well as politically, assembling 
the building blocks for global communities having that identity.
As the Internet becomes more internationalized and globalized, the tech-
nology does not homogenize the social and political experiences of those who 
inhabit cyberspace as if they were in one big “global village” with a singular 
dominant language and imagination. Global networks do indeed enable indi-
viduals to communicate beyond the boundaries of their locales—neighbor-
hoods, hamlets, cities, counties, states, and nation-states—to join a global 
community and partake in global discourses. But their global social expe-
riences always co-exist, connected, overlapping with, and extended to and 
from their local experiences. Cyberspace is another zone in which real world 
events are apprehended in a manner that is connected to the corporality of its 
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users. This also implies that the existence and power relations of nation-states 
and other entities persist in cyberspace; yet, cyberspace offers more fl exible 
boundaries for social identities to be amalgamated.
NOTES
 1. For more on the concept of Ummah, see Wikipedia, “Ummah,” http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ummah (accessed May 20, 2007).
 2. A metanarrative is a big story, a story of mythic proportions that claims to 
account for, explain, and subordinate all lesser, smaller, and local narratives. 
See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowl-
edge (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984); Michel Foucault, 
The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972), associates the concept of metanarrative with legitimacy, 
as it can be used as a tool for social and political mobilization against perceived 
antagonistic, hegemonic forces while it also seeks to create its own hegemony.
 3. For a summary of this controversy, see Wikipedia, “Jyllands-Posten Muham-
mad Cartoons Controversy,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-Posten_
Muhammad_cartoons_controversy (accessed May 18, 2007).
 4. See Wikipedia, “Blogs,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (accessed May 
20, 2007).
 5. Pew Internet Project, “Blogs Gain a Small Foothold,” http://www.pewinter-
net.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=87&Section=ReportLevel2&Field=Lev
el2ID&ID=662
 6. Katie Hafner, “For Some, the Blogging Never Stops,” New York Times, May 
27, 2004 http://www.nytimes.com
 7. BBC News, “‘Blog’ Picked as Word of the Year,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/4059291.stm (December 1, 2004).
 8. Amanda Lenhart and Susannah Fox, “Bloggers: A Picture of the Internet’s 
New Storytellers,” Report (Washington, DC: Pew Internet and American 
Life Project, 2006; also available at http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/186/
report display.asp).
 9. Dan Gillmor, We the Media (Cambridge, MA: O’Reilly, 2004).
 10. Matthew Hindmann, Kostas Tsiotsiouliklis, and Judy Johnson, “Googlear-
chy: How a Few Heavily-linked Sites Dominate Politics Online” (paper pre-
sented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Philadelphia, PA, August 2003).
 11. Cass Sunnstein, Republic.com (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001); Anthony Wilhelm, Democracy in the Digital Age: Challenges to 
Political Life in Cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2000).
 12. Characterized by convergence, low cost, broad availability, and resistance to 
control, the Internet is a “convivial medium” that affords a greater scope for 
freedom, autonomy, creativity, and collaboration than previous media. The 
fi rst use of the term conviviality to describe the sociotechnical landscape of 
the Internet is found in Merlyna Lim, “The Internet, Social Network and 
Reform in Indonesia,” in Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in 
A Networked World, ed. Nick Couldry and James Curran (Lanham, MD: 
Rowan & Littlefi eld, 2003), 274.
 13. Merlyna Lim, “Cyber-Civic Space in Indonesia: From Panopticon to Pande-
monium?,” International Development Planning Review 4, no. 24 (2002): 
383–400; Krishna Sen and David Hill, The Internet and Democracy in 
Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2005).
194 Merlyna Lim
 14. Enda Nasution’s Weblog, http://enda.goblogmedia.com
 15. Priyadi’s Place, http://www.priyadi.net
 16. http://afsyuhud.blogspot.com
 17. Komunitas Blogger Muslim, http://komunitas.muslimblog.net/
 18. Khatami.com, http://www.khatami.com
 19. http://www.netiran.com
 20.  
 21. See CIA, “The World Factbook—Iran,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publi-
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html (accessed May 11, 2008); and Tele-
communication Company of Iran, “TCI at a Glance,” http://www.tci.ir/eng.
asp?sm=0&page=18&code=1
 22. OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in Iran in 2004–2005: A Country 
Study,” http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/
 23. Islamic Republic of Iran, Press Law, Article 2, translation available at http://
www.netiran.com/?fn=law14
 24. Sadeq Saba, “Iran Bans Parliamentary Reporter,” BBC News, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4414895.stm (April 6, 2005).
 25. Editor: Myself. Hossein Derakhshan’s Weblog, http://www.hoder.com/
weblog/
 26. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—The Offi cial Blog, http://www.ahmadinejad.ir/
 27. Martin van Bruinessen, “Yahudi sebagai simbol dalam wacana Islam Indo-
nesia masa kini” [The Jew as a Symbol in Contemporary Muslim Discourse 
in Indonesia], in Spiritualitas baru: Agama dan Aspirasi Rakyat (Seri Dian 
II Tahun I, Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Dian/Interfi dei, 1993), 253–268.
 28. Bruinessen, “Yahudi sebagai simbol.”
 29. Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-Con-
spiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Chicago, CA: Scholars Press, 
1981).
 30. Among these books are: Darouza, Mengungkap tentang Yahudi: Watak, 
Jejak, Pijak dari Kasus-Kasus Lama Bani Israel (Surabaya: Pustaka Progres-
sif, 1982); Madjid Kailany, Bahaya Zionisme terhadap Dunia Islam (Solo: 
Pustaka Mantiq, 1984); Hizbul Haq, Skenario Rahasia untuk Menguasai 
Dunia (Bandung: Hizbul Haq Press, 1989); Pustakakarya, Ayat-Ayat Setan 
Yahudi. Dokumen Rahasia Yahudi Menaklukkan Dunia dan Menghancur-
kan Agama (Jakarta: PT, 1990); The Indonesian editors and publishers of 
these adaptations or translations believed (and shared the belief) that this 
book consists of secret plans of a Jewish organization to rule and dominate 
the world through capitalism, communism, democratization, authoritarian-
ism, revolution, and economic liberation all rolled into one (see Bruinessen, 
“Yahudi sebagai simbol.”). Indonesian editors and publishers do not realize 
that this book is not a historical document at all, but was a fabrication writ-
ten by several anti-Jewish Russians.
 31. Merlyna Lim, Islamic Radicalism and Anti Americanism in Indonesia: The 
Role of the Internet (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005).
 32. Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 
1972).
 33. Bruinessen, “Yahudi sebagai simbol.”
 34. The newspaper asserted that the publication of these cartoons was meant to 
contribute to public discourse about criticism of Islam and self-censorship. 
In response, Danish Muslim organizations held public protests and spread 
the publications worldwide. On October 17, 2005, the Egyptian newspa-
per, El Faq, was the fi rst non-Scandinavian media to publish the cartoons. 
It published six of the images, along with an article strongly denouncing 
them. No known protests from either Egyptian religious authorities or the 
Muslim Voices in the Blogosphere 195
Egyptian government emerged due to this publication. However, in early 
2006, as examples of the cartoons were reprinted in newspapers in more 
than fi fty other countries, the controversy grew and eventually led to pro-
tests, as well as rioting, particularly in the Muslim world.
 35. Freedom for Egyptians, http://freedomforegyptians.blogspot.com
 36. http://egyptiansandmonkey.com
 37. http://mrbehi.blogs.com/i/2006/02/the_danish_pas.html
 38. Preman berjubah (in Indonesian), literally translates as “mobs wearing 
robes.” This term refers to several radical fundamentalist groups who use 
an Islamic face to fi ght against what they interpret as acts of the infi dels 
(khufur/kafi r) or morally wrong. These groups include Front Pembela Islam 
(Islamic Defender Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahe-
deen Council), and some other lesser-known and smaller groups. In execut-
ing their projects, they usually wear robes and turbans.
 39. In Indonesian custom, which is heavily infl uenced by Javanese culture, one 
can show his/her disagreement by saying nothing, as opposed to showing 
support (saying “yes”). Giving no reaction can actually signify disagreement 
or opposition.
 40. CNN World, “Ahmadinejad’s letter to Bush,” http://edition.cnn.com/inter-
active/world/0605/transcript.lemonde.letter/
 41. Adventures of Mr. Behi, http://mrbehi.blogs.com/i/2006/08/ahmadijacket_
lo.html
 42. Rami Yelda, “Money exchange in Hamadan,” http://www.iranian.com/
Shorts/2006/sept2006.html (September 30, 2006).
 43. Sunnstein, Republic.com.
 44. Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity,” in Modernity and Its 
Futures, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 1992), 292–297.
